Session A3a: GNSS Security: Interference, Jamming, and Spoofing 2

Performance of Optimal INS Monitor Against Live Spoofing
Birendra Kujur, Samer Khanafseh, Boris Pervan, Illinois Institute of Technology
Location: Beacon A
Date/Time: Wednesday, Jan. 29, 2:35 p.m.

Peer Reviewed

In this paper, we demonstrate the performance of the proposed optimal Inertial Navigation System (INS) monitor (Kujur et al. (2024)) against live spoofing with multiple Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing scenarios. We evaluate the monitor performance for a live spoofing event where an aircraft was subjected to live GNSS spoofed signals using onboard equipment during its flight with different spoofed trajectories such as step, ramp, and accelerating position offsets. The spoofing signals were generated and broadcast on a single frequency GPS constellation while spoof-free GNSS signals were acquired using other constellations. Spoofed GPS signals, spoof-free GNSS signals, and Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) dynamic data was collected. Results show that the optimal INS monitor can detect spoofing even at sub-decimeter level magnitudes within minutes. As a result, the conducted experiment demonstrates the monitor’s ability to detect realistic GNSS spoofing events even with minimal position offsets, thereby validating the performance of the monitor.