Characterization of Receiver Response to a Spoofing Attacks

Daniel P. Shepard and Todd E. Humphreys

Abstract:	Test procedures are developed for characterizing the response of civil GPS receivers to spoofing attacks. Two response characteristics are analyzed in detail for four representative GPS receivers: (1) the spoofer power advantage over the authentic signals required for successful receiver capture, and (2) the aggressiveness with which a spoofer can manipulate the victim receiver’s time and position solution. Two of the tested receivers are commonly used in critical infrastructure applications, one in smart power grid regulation and one in telecommunications networks. The implications of the test results for these critical infrastructure applications are discussed.
Published in:	Proceedings of the 24th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS 2011) September 20 - 23, 2011 Oregon Convention Center, Portland, Oregon Portland, OR
Pages:	2608 - 2618
Cite this article:	Shepard, Daniel P., Humphreys, Todd E., "Characterization of Receiver Response to a Spoofing Attacks," Proceedings of the 24th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS 2011), Portland, OR, September 2011, pp. 2608-2618.
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