Susceptibility of Inmarsat Navigation Payloads to Jamming and Spoofing: Fact or (Science) Fiction?

George V. Kinal and A.J. Van Dierendonck

Abstract:	The objectives of this paper are: 1) to determine how susceptible Inmarsat-3 navigation repeaters would be to accidental or intentional interference; 2) to determine how difficult it would be for a malevolent interferer (spoofer) to generate a simulated GPS signal that might pass for a real one; 3) to ascertain the effects on civil users of such interference; 4) to suggest monitoring techniques to detect interference; and,5) to consider modifications to future navigation payloads to enhance integrity. The paper demonstrates that the current Inmarsat-3 payload design is resistant to plausible levels of intentional interference; that the combination of dual coverage (redundant) integrity channels and user receiver Fault-Detection Isolation (FDI)/Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring @AIM) would reject spoofing signals; that intentional interference is easily detected by the uplinking earth station; and, that a spoofing signal from a navigation repeater will be realistic (valid) only over a small geographic region, for limited periods of time.
Published in:	Proceedings of the 1993 National Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation January 20 - 22, 1993 Parc 55 Hotel San Francisco, CA
Pages:	459 - 467
Cite this article:	Kinal, George V., Van Dierendonck, A.J., "Susceptibility of Inmarsat Navigation Payloads to Jamming and Spoofing: Fact or (Science) Fiction?," Proceedings of the 1993 National Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation, San Francisco, CA, January 1993, pp. 459-467.
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