ION Technical Content
GNSS Security Issues
| Abstract: | As stated in the Communication from the Commission (COM 98/29 dated 21/01/98) endorsed by the Council, security and defence issues are at stake when considering GNSS: - Firstly, “the availability of highly accurate navigation and positioning services across the continent raises both risks and opportunities”. The threats entailed by the misuse of such services are reinforced by the cur-rent geopolitical context: local conflicts, terrorism, fundamentalism, international crime and arms traf-ficking, including the illegal sale of nuclear materials can and already have spilt over into Europe; - Secondly, some users of GNSS services have strin-gent service guarantee needs. A break in availability could very quickly have dire consequences on na-tional and European levels. This is the case of safety critical applications (air, land or sea), Civil security (police, customs, search and rescue etc.), Communi-cation and data networks (strategic communication and data networks synchronisation as in banking and GSM) and Defence 1 . These are the two main arguments in favour of Europe controlling GNSS systems and services to either guar-antee service provision or deny access if required.Technically and operationally, these two requirements im-ply: - Developing a GNSS2 system with minimum protec-tion, - Developing efficient ways to deny access to GNSS information inside and outside Europe (local jamming is a good means of denying access to GNSS services); - Developing a controlled access service on GNSS2 especially reserved for the previously mentioned “se-curity” users. This controlled access service will have to be managed by a single dedicated European office. This office could be composed of representatives of bodies in charge of secu-rity (Eurocontrol, civil security bodies, NATO and WEU representatives etc.). Furthermore, the European Union Treaty contains a binding commitment for the Union to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CSFP will not be credible if it does not have the ability to deploy Euro-pean common dedicated tools to safeguard its own secu-rity. A controlled access service on GNSS2 used by “secu-rity” users can be one of the instruments to implement a coherent CSFP, equivalent to the Euro currency for Eco-nomic and Monetary Union. Finally, all security and defence issues connected with GNSS will have to be discussed with the USA. In par-ticular, defining common and co-ordinated measures to deny, control, guarantee and certify GNSS services is cru-cial. In short, GNSS2 has to be designed to become a strategic tool for Europe. |
| Published in: |
Proceedings of the 11th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GPS 1998) September 15 - 18, 1998 Nashville, TN |
| Pages: | 1103 - 1110 |
| Cite this article: | Hancart, Benoît, "GNSS Security Issues," Proceedings of the 11th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GPS 1998), Nashville, TN, September 1998, pp. 1103-1110. |
| Full Paper: |
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