Sequential Separate Clock Drift Anomaly Detection Method for GNSS Time Synchronization Attack

Wenhao Li, Minghan Zhong, Mingquan Lu, and Hong Li

Peer Reviewed

Abstract: GNSS timing receivers are vulnerable to Time Synchronization Attacks (TSAs), in which spoofing signals manipulate the timing results while preserving the position and velocity solutions. Existing TSA detection methods mainly aim at channel-wise synchronicity, such as correlated variations in separate clock drift, Doppler shift, or correlation peak distortion, and are effective for full-channel synchronous TSA since it spoofs all channels simultaneously. However, full-channel asynchronous TSA manipulates only one channel at a time. This sequential strategy removes channel-wise synchronicity and weakens conventional joint channel detection metrics, making single-channel anomaly detection necessary for timing protection. To address this problem, this paper proposes a Sequential Separate Clock Drift Anomaly Detection (SSCDAD) method. The key idea is to estimate the authentic clock drift trend from the median of channel-wise separate clock drifts and expose spoofing-induced single-channel deviations through a differential feature. The differential features are further activated by a threshold and accumulated within a sliding window to form the final detection statistic. This statistic provides distinct temporal signatures for spoof-free operation, synchronous TSA, and asynchronous TSA: a near zero distribution in the spoof-free case, an impulsive response at the onset of synchronous TSA, and a sustained response under asynchronous TSA. Field experiments using BeiDou B1I signals verify the complete processing chain from separate clock drift estimation to final detection statistic, demonstrating that the proposed method can effectively detect full-channel synchronous and asynchronous TSA while distinguishing their characteristic response patterns.
Published in: Proceedings of the 39th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2026)
September 14 - 18, 2026
Hyatt Regency Grand Cypress
Orlando, Florida
Pages: 976 - 984
Cite this article: Li, Wenhao, Zhong, Minghan, Lu, Mingquan, Li, Hong, "Sequential Separate Clock Drift Anomaly Detection Method for GNSS Time Synchronization Attack," Proceedings of the 39th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2026), Orlando, Florida, September 2026, pp. 976-984. https://doi.org/10.33012/2026.20770
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