Post Quantum Cryptography and GNSS

Cillian O’Driscoll, Ignacio Fernandez-Hernandez, Jon Winkel, Tom Willems

Peer Reviewed

Abstract:	The looming threat of cryptographically relevant quantum computers means that any system that depends on the use of classical asymmetric cryptography will require significant adjustment in the coming decade. Post-quantum asymmetric algorithms have only just been standardized in the last few years, and those that have been standardized have a number of drawbacks when compared to the classical Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) schemes that are currently widely used. In particular, the signature sizes of these post-quantum schemes are typically orders of magnitude larger than those for ECDSA. This is a particular challenge for bandwidth-constrained applications such as GNSS. In this paper, we investigate the impact of the transition to post-quantum cryptography on civil GNSS signals, focusing in particular on the Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) and GPS Chips Message Robust Authentication (Chimera) schemes.
Published in:	Proceedings of the 2026 International Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation January 26 - 29, 2026 Hyatt Regency Orange County Anaheim, California
Pages:	372 - 384
Cite this article:	O’Driscoll, Cillian, Fernandez-Hernandez, Ignacio, Winkel, Jon, Willems, Tom, "Post Quantum Cryptography and GNSS," Proceedings of the 2026 International Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation, Anaheim, California, January 2026, pp. 372-384. https://doi.org/10.33012/2026.20545
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