GNSS Spoofing Detection and DOA estimation with an Array Receiver and its Digital Twin: Field Test at Jammertest 2025 in Norway

L. Danelli, A. Emmanuele, N. Pastori, R. Colombo, P. Iacone, L. Marradi, L. Siniscalco

Peer Reviewed

Abstract:	Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals are increasingly used for a wide range of applications, both critical and non-critical. However, due to the low-power nature of GNSS signals at the user end, receivers are highly vulnerable to RF interferences, especially to jamming and spoofing attacks. The spoofing is growing RF threat for which external subjects simulates characteristics of authentic GNSS signals, and it, if not properly detected and mitigated, can lead to significant malicious errors and integrity risk in positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services. Traditional signal processing methods may result ineffective to differentiate between authentic and spoofed signals, especially during complex attacks. To address these challenges, detection and mitigation methods become decisive in the design of robust GNSS receivers. Thales Alenia Space Italy has consolidated during last years an advanced receiver array-technology and a joint robust signal processing collection in time/frequency domains, optimized for safety-critical civil applications and resilient ground reference stations. In this frame, this work addresses a post-correlation anti-spoofing GNSS receiver architecture, configured to be fed by a seven-element conformal antenna array and dedicated processing, targeted to spoofing waveforms detection and characterization. In particular, two algorithms are investigated as core of monitoring modules: the Eigen-Ratio (ER) method here presented for spoofing detection, and MUltiple SIgnal Classification (MUSIC) for accurate signal Direction Of Arrival (DOA) estimation. Testing such anti-spoofing systems in live scenarios or controlled environments is complex and costly. Therefore, the authors propose as further objective of the paper, a dual approach based on development of physical test receiver and a high-fidelity “digital twin” to model its characteristics and responses. This combination allows precise, repeatable analysis of attack scenarios, validation of monitoring strategies, and agile iterative development. The receiver and its algorithms were verified during the Jammertest 2025 campaign in Norway, which provided comprehensive, realistic test environments. Observed results showed a strong matching between live-sky acquisition’s outputs and simulations via digital twin, confirming the effectiveness of the proposed approach and validating the developed anti-spoofing techniques. Furthermore, the digital simulator enabled the evaluation and comprehension of various and complex spoofing scenarios. Also in this case, findings highlight that integrating digital twin simulations with hardware-in-the-loop testing offers a powerful framework for developing resilient GNSS receivers, accelerating innovation, and strengthening protection against evolving known and future spoofing threats.
Published in:	Proceedings of the 2026 International Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation January 26 - 29, 2026 Hyatt Regency Orange County Anaheim, California
Pages:	344 - 358
Cite this article:	Danelli, L., Emmanuele, A., Pastori, N., Colombo, R., Iacone, P., Marradi, L., Siniscalco, L., "GNSS Spoofing Detection and DOA estimation with an Array Receiver and its Digital Twin: Field Test at Jammertest 2025 in Norway," Proceedings of the 2026 International Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation, Anaheim, California, January 2026, pp. 344-358. https://doi.org/10.33012/2026.20543
Full Paper:	ION Members/Non-Members: 1 Download Credit Sign In