GNSS Spoofing Identification with Receiver Motion-Induced Doppler (GSIR-MID)

Xin Tian, Zijiao Tian, Jiachen Wang, Genshe Chen, Khanh Pham and Erik Blasch

Peer Reviewed

Abstract:	In contested operation environments, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers are subject to spoofing attacks, where counterfeited GNSS signals are sent to the GNSS receiver to make it produce wrong position, navigation and timing (PNT) results. GNSS spoofing attacks involve simultaneous attacks on multiple active GNSS signal channels could capture the receiver’s tracking loop from the genuine GNSS signals. This paper presents a novel method for the detection of spoofing attacks based on the evaluation of receiver motion-induced Doppler frequency differences (RMIDFD) of the real/fake GNSS signals. It is shown that when the real/fake trajectory corresponding to the real/fake GNSS signals is constant velocity, the evaluated RMIDFD change at nearly constant rates that are close to zero. When the trajectory has a constant acceleration, the rate of the motion-induced Doppler shifts is nearly constant and is substantially non-zero. Accordingly, maneuvers, i.e., changes of velocities (including turns, accelerations that cause changes in velocity) in the trajectory corresponding to the real/fake GNSS signals can be detected using the pattern of changes of the receiver motion-induced Doppler differences. However, with the receiver motion-induced Doppler differences, fake GNSS signals cannot be distinguished from real GNSS signals by examining the signals alone. When the true type of movement of the receiver can be determined, e.g., using onboard Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) sensor data, spoofing GNSS signals can be detected by checking the consistency of the maneuver detection results using the RMIDFD from the GNSS signals against the movement type determined using the IMU sensor data. The proposed RMIDFD method can be effectively implemented in GPS receivers for the identification of spoofing signals and real GNSS signals, and allows the GNSS receiver to detect and recover from spoofing attacks.
Published in:	Proceedings of the 38th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2025) September 8 - 12, 2025 Hilton Baltimore Inner Harbor Baltimore, Maryland
Pages:	2085 - 2098
Cite this article:	Tian, Xin, Tian, Zijiao, Wang, Jiachen, Chen, Genshe, Pham, Khanh, Blasch, Erik, "GNSS Spoofing Identification with Receiver Motion-Induced Doppler (GSIR-MID)," Proceedings of the 38th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2025), Baltimore, Maryland, September 2025, pp. 2085-2098. https://doi.org/10.33012/2025.20251
Full Paper:	ION Members/Non-Members: 1 Download Credit Sign In