Multiple Statistical Tests for Spoofing Detection and Rejection Using Tightly-Coupled GNSS/INS

Isaac Lyss-Loren, Gina Staimer, Fatah Iskandar, Michael R. Thompson, and Sharad C. Shankar

Peer Reviewed

Abstract:	The detection and rejection of individual spoofed Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) measurements is of great interest given the rise in GNSS interference observed around the globe. This work describes strategies for real-time mitigation of GNSS spoofing attacks using integrated Inertial Navigation System (INS) measurements to aid navigation. We propose a method that combines the chi-squared statistical test to identify potentially invalid GNSS signals with the Student’s T-test to identify and remove individual spoofed signals. This method is developed assuming a Tightly-Coupled Extended Kalman Filter for both navigation and solving for clock and INS biases. Simulations of an aircraft experiencing various types of spoofed GNSS signals demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. Index Terms—navigation, global positioning system, inertial sensors, aircraft navigation, space vehicle navigation.
Published in:	2025 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium (PLANS) April 28 - 1, 2025 Salt Lake Marriott Downtown at City Creek Salt Lake City, UT
Pages:	273 - 279
Cite this article:	Lyss-Loren, Isaac, Staimer, Gina, Iskandar, Fatah, Thompson, Michael R., Shankar, Sharad C., "Multiple Statistical Tests for Spoofing Detection and Rejection Using Tightly-Coupled GNSS/INS," 2025 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium (PLANS), Salt Lake City, UT, April 2025, pp. 273-279.
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