Abstract: | The frequency of occurrence of GNSS jamming and spoofing is increasing on multiple fronts. Areas of Eastern Europe are experiencing frequent jamming and spoofing in a wartime environment. This paper first presents evidence of Electronic Warefar (EW) jamming as measured from the southern coast of Finland. Secondly, the paper presents a study of how mass market receivers respond to a coordinated spoofing and RFI attack near Haifa Israel. All mass market GNSS devices with L1 and L5 are captured report their location in Beirut Lebanon. However, a oneNav L5 Direct ™ receiver operates normally. The paper suggests that mass market receivers must fundamentally change the way they acquire signals in case spoofing is suspected: that is, receivers must acquire signals independently so that they cannot be captured by a single point of failure. L1 C/A is such a single point of failure in the L1 band. The paper suggests that the Galileo E5a Quasi pilot is also a single point of failure. To avoid these weaknesses and survive spoofing, receivers should adopt the independent signal acquisition approach implemented in the oneNav L5-Direct ™ receiver. |
Published in: |
Proceedings of the 37th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2024) September 16 - 20, 2024 Hilton Baltimore Inner Harbor Baltimore, Maryland |
Pages: | 1176 - 1188 |
Cite this article: | McBurney, Paul, Shivaramaiah, Nagaraj, Misiaszek, Michal, Compston, Drew, Curticapean, Florean, Tikka, Pasi, Meiri, Dror, Grajski, Kamil, "Empirical Assessment of Benefits of Acquisition of L5 First in a Range of Jamming Cases," Proceedings of the 37th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2024), Baltimore, Maryland, September 2024, pp. 1176-1188. https://doi.org/10.33012/2024.19758 |
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