Synchronized Spoofing Attack Detection Using Galileo OSNMA and an Antenna Array

Markel Arizabaleta-Diez, Toms Dorins, Mihai-Adrian Schipor, Thomas Pany

Peer Reviewed

Abstract:	This paper presents an over-the-air GPS C/A and Galileo E1 spoofing attack. Two different lines of defense mechanisms, Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) and multi-antenna angle of arrival (AOA), have been used to identify the spoofing attack occurrence. Their specific responses to the spoofing attack are shown and are discussed. It has been found that angle-of-arrival indicators quickly indicate the presence of a disturbance, but are partly difficult to interpret in a conclusive manner. On the other hand, OSNMA provides a solid means to identify the attack, but has a much higher latency. The response of the OSNMA detector to the time-synchronized spoofing attack shows a complex pattern, as the spoofer partly predicts the OSNMA fields.
Published in:	Proceedings of the 2024 International Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation January 23 - 25, 2024 Hyatt Regency Long Beach Long Beach, California
Pages:	512 - 523
Cite this article:	Arizabaleta-Diez, Markel, Dorins, Toms, Schipor, Mihai-Adrian, Pany, Thomas, "Synchronized Spoofing Attack Detection Using Galileo OSNMA and an Antenna Array," Proceedings of the 2024 International Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation, Long Beach, California, January 2024, pp. 512-523. https://doi.org/10.33012/2024.19557
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