Baseline Spoofing Detection for Aircraft with Standard Navigation Hardware

Michael Blois, John Studenny, Kyle O’Keefe, Baoyu Liu

Abstract:	The spoofing detection technique presented uses the known baseline separation between GNSS antennas as the truth reference and compares it to calculated antenna baseline separation. The technique is based on the fact that the observed satellite time delay (phase information) is different at each antenna whereas a single antenna spoofer will provide exactly the same phase information at each antenna but slightly time delayed. When satellite data is used, the calculated antenna separation is a close match to the known baseline separation; when spoofer data is used, the calculated antennas separation collapses to zero. This technique is based on a known antenna separation and this known separation allows the computation of thresholds for false spoofing and missed spoofing. The consequence is that spoofing detection performance can be reliably quantified. Further, the desired spoofing performance will in-turn specify the minimum antenna baseline separation. The antenna separation can be calculated using either the pseudorange for a code phase solution or the carrier phase for RealTime-Kinematic (RTK) solution. Any off-the-shelf receiver-antenna can be used provided that it produces the data that enables the computation of a baseline solution. For the same spoofing detection performance, RTK allows for much shorter antenna baselines than a code phase solution. This spoofing detection technique does not require any specialized hardware, a pair off-the-shelf receiver-antenna is adequate. The experiment used a pair of NovAtel receiver-antennas with an off-the-shelf RTK software. The RTK software did not edit, screen or select “the most favorable data”, all data were used from every sample instant as it were used in-flight. The spoofer was a GNSS signal repeater; however, this technique applies equally to a highly sophisticated spoofer. A truck was used to simulate an aircraft. The baseline solution separation (no spoofing) and baseline collapse (spoofing) performance correlates with theory.
Published in:	Proceedings of the 36th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2023) September 11 - 15, 2023 Hyatt Regency Denver Denver, Colorado
Pages:	824 - 835
Cite this article:	Blois, Michael, Studenny, John, O’Keefe, Kyle, Liu, Baoyu, "Baseline Spoofing Detection for Aircraft with Standard Navigation Hardware," Proceedings of the 36th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2023), Denver, Colorado, September 2023, pp. 824-835. https://doi.org/10.33012/2023.19413
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