|Abstract:||Spoofing attacks on the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) have attracted great attention in recent years due to their severe harm to position, velocity, and timing (PVT) service users. Conventional spoofing techniques focus on disabling the victim by directly broadcasting fake GNSS signals and thus could cause obvious alarms. Meanwhile, covert spoofing techniques require precise information or physical access of the victim to carry out spoofing attacks without triggering alarms, but these conditions are not satisfied in numerous real-world scenarios, especially in remote and temporary cases. In this paper, we design a spoofer framework that is suitable for committing remote GNSS spoofing attacks temporarily and covertly. We describe in detail the control strategy to adjust the key parameters of the spoofing signals including the code phase, Doppler frequency shift, signal strength, and navigation message data bit. The observation module that consists of a light detection and ranging (LiDAR) unit and an attitude and heading reference system (AHRS) unit is utilized to provide supplementary information to ensure the validation of the spoofing attacks. A brief error analysis is provided to represent the performance of the proposed spoofer framework. Finally, we develop a prototype based on the spoofer framework and carry out actual spoofing experiments toward a widely used commercial GNSS receiver. The results show that such temporary and covert spoofing attacks are indeed a practical threat.|
Proceedings of the 35th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2022)
September 19 - 23, 2022
Hyatt Regency Denver
|Pages:||3580 - 3591|
|Cite this article:||
Zhong, Minghan, Zhang, Xiaoming, Gao, Weiyu, Lu, Mingquan, Li, Hong, "Prototype Development of a Flexible Covert Spoofer Using Measurement Information from LiDAR and AHRS," Proceedings of the 35th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2022), Denver, Colorado, September 2022, pp. 3580-3591.
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