|Abstract:||Cooperative spoofing attacks are difficult to detect and to mitigate. In these attacks the user or owner of the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver is also the attacker, hence, he can ensure ideal spoofing circumstances. Such attacks are associated with criminal activities where the user wants to falsify his own position. A low-cost tin-can spoofing attack against a snapshot receiver is demonstrated in this paper. Such an attack is similar to a cable inject; however, it couples over-the-air via the antenna of the victim GNSS receiver. Methods to detect such tin-can attacks are proposed where an array of antennas or a dual-polarized antenna is used. The detection criteria is based upon the similarity of the spatial properties of the received signals. The detection metric is analyzed to obtain the analytic detector threshold setting for optimal performance. The results with open service (OS) signals from GPS and Galileo show that with both an array of right-hand circular polarized (RHCP) antennas and a dual-circularly-polarized antenna the spoofing detection is successful. However, the array of antennas has shown superior performance in the detector analysis. This paper practically demonstrates the simplicity and feasibility of a tin-can attack as well as methods to sufficiently detect and counter such attacks. This emphasizes the vulnerability of GNSS receivers, and shows the need for multiple channel operation for robust high-performance receivers.|
Proceedings of the 32nd International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2019)
September 16 - 20, 2019
Hyatt Regency Miami
|Pages:||4011 - 4025|
|Cite this article:||
Merwe, J. Rossouw van der, Rügamer, Alexander, Popugaev, Alexander, Zubizarreta, Xabier, Felber, Wolfgang, "Cooperative Spoofing Attack Detection Using Multiple Antennas and a Snapshot Receiver," Proceedings of the 32nd International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2019), Miami, Florida, September 2019, pp. 4011-4025.
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