Sensitivity Analysis of Potential Future Authentication Components for Open Service GNSS Signals

Elias Gkougkas, Thomas Pany, Bernd Eissfeller

Abstract:	The paper presents and compares different signal implementations of future authentication components applicable at system level, which could be taken into account for the design of new generation GNSS services. The authentication components are based on the concept of spreading code authentication (SCA) where primary spreading sequences are partially or complete encrypted and a posterior despreading is applied as soon as the secret key to generate the encrypted sequence is received. The encrypted key can be received through a data component where navigation message authentication (NMA) is employed. The primary objective of the analysis is to illustrate the impact of the signal design of a future authentication component on the robustness performance against spoofing attacks. For this reason different chip rates, waveform modulations and power allocations for an additional authentication component are discussed and evaluated. For the different modulation techniques and for different despreading mechanisms, taking into account partial or complete encrypted sequences, a sensitivity analysis is conducted. The analysis considers aspects like the receiver complexity, the required integration window for the revealing of the authentication component and the robustness gain introduced when certain spoofing attacks are employed. A particular emphasis is given to meaconing attacks and security code estimation and replay attacks (SCER). Based on these attack scenarios, the advantages and disadvantages of each modulation waveform are highlighted. Additionally, an investigation of the required integration windows for different detection probabilities and for given false alarm rates is conducted. The assessment considers apart from code-based correlation techniques as well codeless-based techniques.
Published in:	Proceedings of the 31st International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2018) September 24 - 28, 2018 Hyatt Regency Miami Miami, Florida
Pages:	1389 - 1401
Cite this article:	Gkougkas, Elias, Pany, Thomas, Eissfeller, Bernd, "Sensitivity Analysis of Potential Future Authentication Components for Open Service GNSS Signals," Proceedings of the 31st International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2018), Miami, Florida, September 2018, pp. 1389-1401. https://doi.org/10.33012/2018.16010
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