Evaluation of the Detection and Mitigation of Time Synchronization Attacks on the Global Positioning System

Ali Khalajmehrabadi, Nikolaos Gatsis, David Akopian

Peer Reviewed

Abstract: This paper provides an evaluation of the proposed Time Synchronization Attack Rejection and Mitigation (TSARM) technique. The evaluation platform includes a real GPS spoofing mechanism available in TEXBAT and applied on the raw GNSS measurements obtained from a commercial GPS receiver. The key signatures to observe are the deviations on the clock bias and drift of the receiver under spoofed and normal conditions. The numerical evaluation substantiates the strengths of TSARM and renders great insight to its practicality in mitigating the effects of a real spoofer.
Published in: 2018 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium (PLANS)
April 23 - 26, 2018
Hyatt Regency Hotel
Monterey, CA
Pages: 1368 - 1371
Cite this article: Khalajmehrabadi, Ali, Gatsis, Nikolaos, Akopian, David, "Evaluation of the Detection and Mitigation of Time Synchronization Attacks on the Global Positioning System," 2018 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium (PLANS), Monterey, CA, April 2018, pp. 1368-1371.
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