Title: Evaluation of the Detection and Mitigation of Time Synchronization Attacks on the Global Positioning System
Author(s): Ali Khalajmehrabadi, Nikolaos Gatsis, David Akopian
Published in: Proceedings of IEEE/ION PLANS 2018
April 23 - 26, 2018
Hyatt Regency Hotel
Monterey, CA
Pages: 1368 - 1371
Cite this article: Khalajmehrabadi, Ali, Gatsis, Nikolaos, Akopian, David, "Evaluation of the Detection and Mitigation of Time Synchronization Attacks on the Global Positioning System," Proceedings of IEEE/ION PLANS 2018, Monterey, CA, April 2018, pp. 1368-1371.
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Abstract: This paper provides an evaluation of the proposed Time Synchronization Attack Rejection and Mitigation (TSARM) technique. The evaluation platform includes a real GPS spoofing mechanism available in TEXBAT and applied on the raw GNSS measurements obtained from a commercial GPS receiver. The key signatures to observe are the deviations on the clock bias and drift of the receiver under spoofed and normal conditions. The numerical evaluation substantiates the strengths of TSARM and renders great insight to its practicality in mitigating the effects of a real spoofer.