Preliminary Assessment on the Vulnerability of NMA-based Galileo Signals for a Special Class of Record & Replay Spoofing Attacks

Daniel Maier, Kathrin Frankl, Ronny Blum, Bernd Eissfeller, Thomas Pany

Abstract:	The authentication of GNSS signals becomes more and more important in recent years. The Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) is one approach to provide authentication of the GNSS data level. In this work, the capability and vulnerability of NMA-authenticated Galileo E1B INAV signals are evaluated. To this end, different case studies emulating spoofing attacks are investigated. The results of these tests provide a first assessment on the capability and vulnerability of NMAauthenticated Galileo signals.
Published in:	2018 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium (PLANS) April 23 - 26, 2018 Hyatt Regency Hotel Monterey, CA
Pages:	63 - 71
Cite this article:	Maier, Daniel, Frankl, Kathrin, Blum, Ronny, Eissfeller, Bernd, Pany, Thomas, "Preliminary Assessment on the Vulnerability of NMA-based Galileo Signals for a Special Class of Record & Replay Spoofing Attacks," 2018 IEEE/ION Position, Location and Navigation Symposium (PLANS), Monterey, CA, April 2018, pp. 63-71. https://doi.org/10.1109/PLANS.2018.8373366
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