Title: An INS Monitor Against GNSS Spoofing Attacks During GBAS and SBAS-assisted Aircraft Landing Approaches
Author(s): Cagatay Tanil, Samer Khanafseh, Boris Pervan
Published in: Proceedings of the 29th International Technical Meeting of The Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2016)
September 12 - 16, 2016
Oregon Convention Center
Portland, Oregon
Pages: 2981 - 2990
Cite this article: Tanil, Cagatay, Khanafseh, Samer, Pervan, Boris, "An INS Monitor Against GNSS Spoofing Attacks During GBAS and SBAS-assisted Aircraft Landing Approaches," Proceedings of the 29th International Technical Meeting of The Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2016), Portland, Oregon, September 2016, pp. 2981-2990.
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Abstract: In this paper, we propose a simple monitor that utilizes Inertial Navigation System (INS) to detect spoofing attacks on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). It is an innovation-based monitor that can be implemented into positioning systems using a loosely-coupled INS-GNSS integration in a Kalman filter, which is consistent with both GroundBased and Space-Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS and SBAS). The main contribution of this paper is the development of a framework that integrates the monitor (detector) and estimator, which provides a fully stochastic integrity risk analysis. The performance of the monitor is evaluated in presence of a spoofer capable of tracking and estimating the aircraft position, and computing the worst-case sequence of GNSS fault. Utilizing this worst-case fault, we simulated GBASassisted final approach of Boeing 747. The simulation results demonstrate that unless the spoofers position-tracking devices have unrealistic accuracy, the proposed monitor efficiently detects spoofing attacks and meets the most stringent integrity requirements in aviation applications.