Kalman Filter-based INS Monitor to Detect GNSS Spoofers Capable of Attacking Aircraft Position

Title:	Kalman Filter-based INS Monitor to Detect GNSS Spoofers Capable of Attacking Aircraft Position
Author(s):	Cagatay Tanil, Samer Khanafseh, Mathieu Joerger, Boris Pervan
Published in:	Proceedings of IEEE/ION PLANS 2016 April 11 - 14, 2016 Hyatt Regency Hotel Savannah, GA
Pages:	1027 - 1034
Cite this article:	Tanil, Cagatay, Khanafseh, Samer, Joerger, Mathieu, Pervan, Boris, "Kalman Filter-based INS Monitor to Detect GNSS Spoofers Capable of Attacking Aircraft Position," Proceedings of IEEE/ION PLANS 2016, Savannah, GA, April 2016, pp. 1027-1034.
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Abstract:	In this work, we propose an innovation-based INS spoofing monitor that utilizes a tightly-coupled INSGNSS integration in a Kalman filter. The performance of the monitor is evaluated when a spoofer tracks and estimates the aircraft position. To create the worst case spoofing conditions, we analytically derive a Kalman filter-based worst-case sequence of spoofed GNSS measurements. Utilizing this worst-case spoofing attack scenario during a Boeing 747 (B747) final approach, we prove that unless the spoofer’s position-tracking devices have unrealistic accuracy and no-delay, the proposed INS monitor performance is highly effective in detecting spoofing attacks.

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