Clock-based Monitoring for Meaconig Attack on GNSS Receivers and its Physical Evaluation

Takashi Iwamoto, Tomoaki Takewa, and Wataru Tsujita

Peer Reviewed

Abstract:	This paper analyzes range capture signals that directly threatens global navigation satellite systems. The decomposition of a range capture signal is derived. Meaconing, or re-broadcasting, attack is already one of the most imminent threats and it is shown that there is room for an orderof-magnitude improvement in energy efficiency. Furthermore, the inequality that upper bounds positioning errors using a receiver clock is introduced in response to overlooked problems of geometry conditions and measurement fluctuations. Physical experiments using reflection signals as “passive” meaconing signals having a huge power advantage show promising results.
Published in:	Proceedings of the 28th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2015) September 14 - 18, 2015 Tampa Convention Center Tampa, Florida
Pages:	3422 - 3425
Cite this article:	Iwamoto, Takashi, Takewa, Tomoaki, Tsujita, Wataru, "Clock-based Monitoring for Meaconig Attack on GNSS Receivers and its Physical Evaluation," Proceedings of the 28th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2015), Tampa, Florida, September 2015, pp. 3422-3425.
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