GNSS Spoofing Attack Detection using Aircraft Autopilot Response to Deceptive Trajectory

Cagatay Tanil, Samer Khanafseh and Boris Pervan

Peer Reviewed

Abstract:	In this work, we propose an innovation-based spoofing monitor that utilizes a tightly-coupled INS-GNSS integration in a Kalman filter and investigate the impact on spoofing detection due to an aircraft’s dynamic response to control actions (actuated by the pilot or autopilot) during a spoofing attack. To evaluate the performance of the proposed monitor, we generalize the spoofing integrity analysis by deriving a rigorous statistical methodology capturing the aircraft compensator dynamics in estimation and detection. We prove that for INS-RAIM-equipped aircrafts, aircraft controller response to a spoofed GNSS signal improves the detection capability of the aircrafts. The reason is that the autopilot response will be instantaneously sensed by the inertial sensors, but not reflected in the spoofed GNSS signal. The impact of a generic altitude hold autopilot on the detection of the worst-case spoofing attacks is demonstrated using a standard approach of Boeing 747 (B747). We show that even without exposure to other disturbances such as wind gusts, control reactions to the spoofers deceptive input significantly enhance INS RAIM detection of the spoofing attack although we conservatively select B747 as the least maneuverable aircraft.
Published in:	Proceedings of the 28th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2015) September 14 - 18, 2015 Tampa Convention Center Tampa, Florida
Pages:	3345 - 3357
Cite this article:	Tanil, Cagatay, Khanafseh, Samer, Pervan, Boris, "GNSS Spoofing Attack Detection using Aircraft Autopilot Response to Deceptive Trajectory," Proceedings of the 28th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2015), Tampa, Florida, September 2015, pp. 3345-3357.
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