Abstract: | Vulnerability of GNSS users to signal spoofing is a critical threat to positioning integrity, especially in aviation applications where the consequences are potentially catastrophic. Spoofing may even become a more serious risk to aviation in the near future with the rollout of the GPS-based Next Generation Air Traffic Control (ATC) system, and the corresponding reduction in reliance on ground-based radar systems by ATC. In this work, we generalize the spoofing integrity analysis by deriving the statistical dynamic response of an aircraft to a vertical wind gust power spectrum (the Dryden Gust Turbulence model). In aircraft with INS-RAIM, the vehicle dynamic response to wind gusts provides an advantage for detection of the spoofing attack. The reason is that the aircraft response to a gust will be instantaneously reflected in INS measurements, but not in the spoofed GPS signal. The main contribution of this work is the development of a rigorous methodology to compute upper bounds on the integrity risk resulting from a worst case spoofing attack without needing to simulate individual aircraft approaches with an unmanageably large number specific gust disturbance profiles. We use a Boeing 747 aircraft model to demonstrate the performance of the INS-RAIM monitor under worst-case GPS spoofing and to investigate gust intensity levels that are sufficient to meet integrity risk requirements for precision landing approach. |
Published in: |
Proceedings of the ION 2015 Pacific PNT Meeting April 20 - 23, 2015 Marriott Waikiki Beach Resort & Spa Honolulu, Hawaii |
Pages: | 674 - 686 |
Cite this article: | Tanil, Cagatay, Khanafseh, Samer, Pervan, Boris, "Impact of Wind Gusts on Detectability of GPS Spoofing Attacks Using RAIM with INS Coupling," Proceedings of the ION 2015 Pacific PNT Meeting, Honolulu, Hawaii, April 2015, pp. 674-686. |
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