A Robust Method for Spoofing Prevention and Position Recovery in Attacks against Networked GPS Receivers

Nathaniel Carson, David Bevly

Peer Reviewed

Abstract:	With the growing level of dependence on the Global Positioning System (GPS), it is critical to protect its integrity and ensure its robustness against a variety of threats. Until recent years, knowledge of the structure, operation, and technologies behind GPS was not extensively available in civilian arenas. But the growing popularity of GPS has led to increased public knowledge of its operating principles. Along with increased use has come a variety of threats. Due to the structure of the GPS signal and its relative weakness compared to local background noise, GPS is susceptible to both jamming and spoofing attacks. Jamming operates by blanketing a region in GPS frequency noise to prevent receivers from detecting authentic signals. Spoofing is a more sophisticated method of attack in which receivers are deceived into tracking false signals and calculating an incorrect position solution. Methods of detecting such attacks have been researched on several fronts mostly in the signals processing arena where signal power and other parameters can provide indications of spoofing [1]. This paper presents a spoofing prevention method which provides a way to detect, identify, and mitigate a spoofing attack on a networked GPS receiver. The method uses ranging information between nodes to detect anomalies that indicate spoofing of the GPS positions. Signal parameters of the attacking signal are extracted by tracking loops designated to the spoofed signal. Using these parameters, the encroaching signal is removed in the IF stage by a successive interference cancelation (SIC) method. This anti-spoofing routine has an advantage over other methods due to its robustness in a wide variety of situations combined with its ability to mitigate an attack without any prior knowledge of the spoofer or the spoofed signal characteristics.
Published in:	Proceedings of the 2015 International Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation January 26 - 28, 2015 Laguna Cliffs Marriott Dana Point, California
Pages:	623 - 632
Cite this article:	Carson, Nathaniel, Bevly, David, "A Robust Method for Spoofing Prevention and Position Recovery in Attacks against Networked GPS Receivers," Proceedings of the 2015 International Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation, Dana Point, California, January 2015, pp. 623-632.
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