Securing GNSS: An End-to-end Feasibility Analysis for the Galileo Open-service

James T. Curran and Matteo Paonni

Abstract:	This paper proposes a candidate implementation of a hybrid navigation message authentication and spreading code encryption scheme based on the TESLA broadcast authentication protocol, tailored specifically to the Galileo E1 OS navigation message structure. Constrained by the potentially available un-allocated space in the current Galileo E1 OS message structure, the proposed solution is optimized with respect to a set of relevant performance criteria with a view to providing anti-spoofing capabilities to a wide range of user profiles, from military to civilian. A performance and security analysis is then presented, considering a mass-market receiver user operating in both open-sky and urban environments. In this manner the study explores the capacity and the limitations of a system-side authentication solution in the context of the typical civilian user.
Published in:	Proceedings of the 27th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2014) September 8 - 12, 2014 Tampa Convention Center Tampa, Florida
Pages:	2828 - 2842
Cite this article:	Curran, James T., Paonni, Matteo, "Securing GNSS: An End-to-end Feasibility Analysis for the Galileo Open-service," Proceedings of the 27th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2014), Tampa, Florida, September 2014, pp. 2828-2842.
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