Real-Time Spoofing Detection Using Correlation Between two Civil GPS Receiver

Brady W. O’Hanlon, Mark L. Psiaki, Todd E. Humphreys, Jahshan A. Bhatti

Abstract:	A real-time method for detecting GPS spoofing in a narrow-bandwidth civilian GPS receiver has been implemented and tested, both in the absence of and in the presence of spoofing. The system was implemented as a software-defined radio system on a personal computer, using a pair of narrow-bandwidth radio front-ends that were geographically separated, with data transmitted between the two over the Internet. The presence of a spoofing signal is determined by mixing and accumulating the base-band quadrature channel samples from the two receivers, with the aim of cross-correlating the P(Y) code that should be present in both signals in the absence of spoofing. Several spoofing attacks were successfully detected in real-time.
Published in:	Proceedings of the 25th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS 2012) September 17 - 21, 2012 Nashville Convention Center, Nashville, Tennessee Nashville, TN
Pages:	3584 - 3590
Cite this article:	O’Hanlon, Brady W., Psiaki, Mark L., Humphreys, Todd E., Bhatti, Jahshan A., "Real-Time Spoofing Detection Using Correlation Between two Civil GPS Receiver," Proceedings of the 25th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS 2012), Nashville, TN, September 2012, pp. 3584-3590.
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