GNSS Spoofing Detection Based on Receiver C/No Estimates

Vahid Dehghanian, John Nielsen, Gerard Lachapelle

Abstract:	A perceived emerging threat to GNSS receivers is posed by a standoff spoofing transmitter that emulates authentic signals but with randomized code phase and Doppler over a target area extending over several hundred meters in radius. The victim GNSS receiver computes the navigation solution based on these counterfeit signals which are subsequently passed on to the location services application layer as being reliable with potentially damaging consequences. An effective spoofing detection technique is developed in this paper, based on signal power measurements that can be readily applied to present consumer grade GNSS receivers with minimal firmware changes. While the average authentic satellite signal power is uniform in the target area, the spoofer average signal power is highly affected by pathloss which can be used to discriminate between the authentic and the spoofer signals. The proposed technique utilizes C/N0 measurements to detect a spoofing threat and is effective in minimizing the affected area to an annulus in range. An extensive statistical analysis is carried out based on formulating a multi-hypothesis detection problem. Expressions are developed to devise a set of thresholds required for signal detection and identification. The statistical analysis supports the effectiveness of the proposed spoofing detection technique under various multipath conditions.
Published in:	Proceedings of the 25th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS 2012) September 17 - 21, 2012 Nashville Convention Center, Nashville, Tennessee Nashville, TN
Pages:	2878 - 2884
Cite this article:	Dehghanian, Vahid, Nielsen, John, Lachapelle, Gerard, "GNSS Spoofing Detection Based on Receiver C/No Estimates," Proceedings of the 25th International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS 2012), Nashville, TN, September 2012, pp. 2878-2884.
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