| Abstract: | Typical single-antenna global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers are highly susceptible to interference, especially from jamming and spoofing attacks. The use of an antenna array at the receiver may mitigate the impact of such attacks on GNSS reception and enable attacker localization. We investigate jammer and spoofer localization using the KrakenSDR, a low-cost multi-channel software-defined radio. The performance of the KrakenSDR was characterized for direction-of-arrival estimation and localization against commercial jammers during the open GNSS test campaign “Jammertest 2023” in Andøya, Norway. The tests included simple scenarios in which the jammer was displaced, as well as car-based jamming and spoofing observed in different receiver setups. Direction finding was accurate across tests for an unobstructed line of sight, which was ensured for simpler tests. The multipath environment affected vehicle-based jammer localization but correctly identified the car’s approach and provided consistent velocity estimates. The driving-based spoofing localization estimated the spoofer position close to its true position and also provided position data from GNSS spoofing. |
| Published in: | NAVIGATION: Journal of the Institute of Navigation, Volume 73, Number |
| Cite this article: |
Citation Tools are available on the NAVIGATION open access site
https://doi.org/10.33012/navi.735 |
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