GPS Spoofing Mitigation and Timing Risk Analysis in Networked Phasor Measurement Units via Stochastic Reachability

Sriramya Bhamidipati and Grace Gao

Peer Reviewed

Abstract:	To address phasor measurement unit (PMU) vulnerability to spoofing, we propose the use of a set-valued state estimation technique known as stochastic reachability (SR)-based distributed Kalman filter (DKF) that computes secure global positioning system (GPS) timing across a network of receivers. Utilizing SR, we estimate not only GPS time but also its stochastic reachable set, which is parameterized by probabilistic zonotope (p-Zonotope). While requiring known measurement error bounds in only non-spoofed conditions, we designed a two-tiered approach. We first performed measurement-level spoofing mitigation via deviation of a measurement innovation from its expected p-Zonotope. We then performed state-level timing risk analysis via a determination of the intersection probability of the estimated p-Zonotope with an unsafe set that violates IEEE C37.118.1a-2014 standards. Finally, we validated our SR-DKF algorithm by subjecting it to a simulated receiver network to coordinate signal-level spoofing. We demonstrate improved timing accuracy and successful spoofing mitigation via the use of our SR-DKF algorithm. We also validated the robustness of the estimated timing risk as the number of receivers were varied.
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Published in:	NAVIGATION: Journal of the Institute of Navigation, Volume 70, Number 3
Cite this article:	Citation Tools https://doi.org/10.33012/navi.574
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