GNSS interferometric reflectometry signature-based defense

Steven W. Lewis, C. Edward Chow, Felipe Geremia-Nievinski, Dennis M. Akos, Sherman Lo

Peer Reviewed

Abstract: Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals are vulnerable to radio frequency interference (RFI) and spoofing. RFI detection has become trivial with many detection algorithms available and built into GNSS receivers; this is not the case with spoofing. GNSS spoofing can involve generating false GNSS signals with one or more altered components of GNSS satellite transmissions: radio frequency (RF) carrier, pseudorandom noise codes, and/or the broadcast navigation messages. We present GNSS interferometric reflectometry (GNSS-IR) signature-based defense: a new methodology to defend wireless space-based positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) transmissions against spoofing by leveraging existing, fixed GNSS receivers used in GNSS-dependent critical infrastructure and key resource sectors. GNSS-IR signature-enabled defense provides spoofing and RFI detection without any changes to existing architecture by conducting input validation of GNSS receiver observables against the generated GNSS-IR truth calibration signatures. This paper includes an overview of the theory, methodology, and results of live-sky signature variability experiments.
Published in: NAVIGATION, Journal of the Institute of Navigation, Volume 67, Number 4
Pages: 727 - 743
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