Real-Time GPS Spoofing Detection via Correlation of Encrypted Signals

Brady W. O’Hanlon, Mark L. Psiaki, Jahshan A. Bhatti, Daniel P. Shepard, and Todd E. Humphreys

Peer Reviewed

Abstract: A method for detecting the spoofing of civilian GPS signals has been implemented and successfully tested in a real-time system. GPS signal spoofing is an attack method whereby a third party transmits a signal that appears authentic but induces the receiver under attack to compute an erroneous navigation solution, time, or both. The detection system described herein provides a defense against such attacks. It makes use of correlations between the unknown encrypted GPS L1 P(Y) code signals from two narrow-band civilian receivers to verify the presence or absence of spoofing. One of these receivers is assumed to be at a secure location that is not subject to spoofing. The other receiver is the potential spoofing victim for which the present developments constitute a defense. Successful detection results are presented using a reference receiver in Ithaca, New York, a victim receiver in Austin, Texas, and a spoofer in Austin, Texas.
Published in: NAVIGATION, Journal of the Institute of Navigation, Volume 60, Number 4
Pages: 267 - 278
Cite this article: O’Hanlon, Brady W., Psiaki, Mark L., Bhatti, Jahshan A., Shepard, Daniel P., Humphreys, Todd E., "Real-Time GPS Spoofing Detection via Correlation of Encrypted Signals", NAVIGATION, Journal of The Institute of Navigation, Vol. 60, No. 4, Winter 2013, pp. 267-278.
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