Effective GPS Spoofing Detection Utilizing Metrics from Commercial Receivers
Esteban Garbin Manfredini, Politecnico di Torino, Italy; Dennis M. Akos; University of Colorado at Boulder; Yu-Hsuan Chen, Sherman Lo, Todd Walter, and Per Enge, Stanford University
Location: Grand Ballroom G
Date/Time: Thursday, Feb. 1, 4:05 p.m.
Spoofing attacks are a major threat to civilian GNSS usage given the powerful impact that they have on a receiver. Many different anti-spoofing techniques have been developed in past years and best practices algorithms combine complimentary techniques to generate optimized protection. In this paper we utilize anti-spoofing techniques that make use of the outputs from commercial off the shelf receivers. It combines the observation of power measurements and the control of asymmetries in the correlation function. The technique’s nominal behavior is assessed using real datasets from Wide Area Augmentation System stations and the spoofing detection capabilities are tested by means of the Texas spoofing test battery. The correlation between various metrics is also observed to lower the false alarm probabilities, particularly between the power measurement and the carrier to noise density ratio information. A major application of this observation is the distinction between spoofing attacks and interference events.