Session A2: GNSS Security: Interference, Jamming, and Spoofing 1

Observations of GNSS Spoofing in Russia in 2023-2024
Sherman Lo, Zixi Liu, Lyla Ibrahim, Yu Hsuan Chen, Todd Walter, Stanford University
Location: Beacon A

Recent events in 2023-24 have highlighted the significant threat posed by GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) radio frequency interference (RFI), including jamming and spoofing. Contrary to previously held beliefs that sophisticated RFI—often thought to be limited to nation-state capabilities—would not impact civilian operations outside of global conflicts. Regional conflicts, such as those in Ukraine and Israel/Gaza, have demonstrated otherwise. These conflicts reveal that advanced GNSS RFI can be deployed with effects extending far beyond the immediate area of military activity.
In this study, we analyze GPS-derived data from aircraft automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) reports to investigate GNSS spoofing in Russia. We begin by tracing the history and evolution of this spoofing activity over time. We then estimate the geographical extent of spoofed areas and examine the characteristics of spoofed positions. To deepen our understanding, we analyze the effects of spoofing on individual aircraft and identify common patterns across multiple flights.
Our analysis reveals a strong correlation between the onset of GNSS spoofing in Russia and the escalation of Ukrainian long-range strikes, suggesting that spoofing is being used as an air defense mechanism in response to these attacks. This correlation underscores the strategic use of GNSS interference as a countermeasure to air incursions.
Through studies of individual flights, we highlight different types of spoofing events, such as the December 2023 incidents involving circular trajectories near Smolensk and a spoofed approach to an airport in Crimea. By analyzing the ADS-B data in combination with flight profiles, we estimate the areas affected by these spoofing events. Although there are challenges due to gaps in ADS-B coverage within Russia, our analysis provides insights into where and when spoofing occurs.
Additionally, we uncover key characteristics of spoofing's impact on aircraft systems. For example, the affected area of the Smolensk spoofing varies depending on the aircraft’s direction of flight, likely due to receiver dynamics. We also observe variations in the smoothness of spoofed flight paths, which may indicate whether the aircraft’s GNSS system was fully or partially compromised. Metrics such as altitude, navigation accuracy category (NAC), and navigation integrity category (NIC) are also analyzed to assess their potential use in detecting spoofing more efficiently.
In summary, this paper provides a comprehensive examination of GNSS spoofing in Russia during 2023-24 based on crowdsourced ADS-B reports. It demonstrates a clear connection between spoofing activities and Ukrainian long-range strikes and offers new insights into how spoofing affects avionics systems. By analyzing multiple flights, we identify consistent patterns in spoofing behavior and explore methods for spoofing detection.