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Session B4: Interference, Jamming, and Spoofing 2

Scalable, Occlusion-Aware Geolocation of Ground-Based GNSS Jammers with Networked Smartphones
Glenn Jones, Daniel Broyles, Tim Machin, Air Force Institute of Technology
Location: Grand Ballroom GH
Date/Time: Wednesday, Apr. 30, 2:58 p.m.

The advancement of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) technology in modern smartphones has made these devices pervasive in both civilian and military applications. Although smartphone GNSS chipsets are more susceptible to jamming and spoofing than military-grade hardware, smartphone networks offer an underutilized opportunity to detect and mitigate threats to position, navigation, and timing (PNT) services essential to the Department of Defense (DoD) and civilian first responders. Traditional methods for geolocating ground-based jamming sources using smartphone GNSS often fail in environments with dense vegetation or significant occlusions, resulting in substantial localization errors. This study addresses these limitations and demonstrates how smartphone networks can successfully locate a jamming source by integrating cloud-based environmental occlusion modeling with scalable, efficient localization algorithms. Simulated results demonstrate that this approach achieves an average localization accuracy within tens of meters for a single ground-based jammer in challenging, occluded settings.

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