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Session C7: Military PNT Equipment: M-Code Receiver Testing

Value of Inertially Aided Motion in NAVWAR Environments
Andy Huizinga and Curtis Cutright, Honeywell
Location: Ballroom D
Date/Time: Tuesday, Jun. 3, 4:45 p.m.

As Honeywell’s Military (M)-Code Embedded Global Positioning System Inertial Navigation Systems (EGI’s) have begun fielding within the user community following the successful Military Standard Order – C145b (MSO-C145b) authorization, result based discussion of the robustness of the M-Code EGI’s within the Electronic Warfare (EW) contested Global Positioning System (GPS) environments that they were designed to operate within is warranted. This presentation will review Hardware-in-the-loop (HWIL) testing results in GPS degraded/GPS denied environments. These environments will include jamming and alternate trajectories.
The HWIL test results shown in the presentation will demonstrate the baseline protection provided by the Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) Increment 1 Aviation Form Factor Trimble Model 71 receiver and detail the additional robustness enabled by providing aiding from navigation grade inertial sensors when the receiver is embedded in the Honeywell M-Code EGI. Discussion will include alternate trajectory test results for helicopter and high-subsonic flight envelopes broadly applicable to Department of Defense (DoD) aviation platforms.
The primary focus of the presentation will be on practical Concepts of Operations (ConOps) for increasing the ability of the Honeywell M-Code EGI to use signals consistent with the inertial measurements in environments where alternate trajectories are present. The focus of the proposed ConOps will be on maximizing effectiveness in those environments while also minimizing impact on operator cognitive load and minimizing impact to mission planning.
Honeywell’s Inertial GPS Hybrid (HIGHTM) is designed against and verified to protect against DO-229 Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Global Positioning System/Wide Area Augmentation System Airborne Equipment defined Single Satellite fault modes. However, due to the robust design within the solution separation algorithm, it can provide limited protection against alternate trajectories. Result-based discussion on HIGHTM’s capabilities and limitations will be provided. Notably, these capabilities are also present on Selective Availability/Anti Spoofing Module (SAASM) based EGI’s that contain HIGHTM.
Finally, there will be discussion on Honeywell’s GPS Threat Monitor (GTM), an algorithm designed to prohibit spoofed GPS measurements from corrupting the inertially aided blended solution.

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