Detecting manipulated spaceborne positioning and timing in real-time by cross-checking with information coming from additional sources is a straightforward concept. Proposed implementations in literature typically involved specialty instruments in complex harnesses that are not economically feasible to operate nor deployable outside controlled environments. A lack of meaningful sensory coverage in real world scenarios renders these innovative ideas less practical. Manipulation attacks of spaceborne positioning and timing signals, colloquially “spoofing,” are typically carried out in the geographical vicinity of their targets. These include asynchronous attacks such as meaconing, and the more subtle nevertheless significantly severe threat of synchronous attacks. Synchronous attack is the ability to apply smooth and gradual time shifts in their targets. A repertoire of classical and modern mathematical and statistical algorithms is required for detecting the full range of these attacks using analytics of local, regional, and worldwide data. Efficacy of these algorithms could only be achieved when they are operated with access to repositories of historical data from a wide range of sources which are typically devoid in dedicated appliances. This talk describes a proof-of-concept ground-based harness for detecting manipulated spaceborne positioning and timing. This harness is a trustworthy and resilient general-purpose computing platform. It is constructed of commercial-off-the-shelf systems and components. It makes simultaneous use of GPS and Iridium satellite constellations to get and keep UTC-accuracy, and to acquire its contemporaneous geographical location for effective detection and report of spoofing attacks. This is a collaboration of Sync-n-Scale, Satelles, HPE, APC and Microsoft with support from NIST. This functional baseline reference is for others to replicate and to expand further for their specific needs.