Session A2: GNSS Security: Interference, Jamming, and Spoofing 1

Observations of GNSS Spoofing in Russia in 2023-2024
Sherman Lo, Zixi Liu, Lyla Ibrahim, Yu Hsuan Chen, and Todd Walter, Stanford University
Location: Beacon A
Date/Time: Wednesday, Jan. 29, 9:20 a.m.

Peer Reviewed

Recent events in 2023-24 have highlighted the significant threat posed to Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) radio frequency interference (RFI), including jamming and spoofing. Contrary to earlier assumptions that sophisticated RFI – previously believed to be the domain of those with nation-state resources - would not impact civilian operations beyond the conflict regions, these recent events demonstrated otherwise. For example, GNSS RFI due to regional conflicts, such as those in Ukraine and Israel/Gaza, have had impacts well beyond the conflict zone, affecting hundreds of aircraft, ships and other GNSS users daily. These conflicts reveal that advanced GNSS RFI are being deployed in a way that results in their effects extending far beyond the immediate area of military activity.

In this study, we analyze GPS-derived data from aircraft automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) reports to investigate multiple and regular instances of GNSS spoofing in Russia. Starting in 2023, ADS-B reports indicated multiple areas showing widespread spoofing. Two major areas are in Russia: 1) Smolensk where aircraft are being spoofed in a circle and 2) in the Black Sea where aircraft are being spoofed to an airport in Crimea.

These incidents offer a valuable opportunity to study the effects of more sophisticated real-world spoofing. We analyze the geographical extent of spoofed region and how the affected regions change on different flights. We examine the characteristics of spoofing to see if there are other metrics in the ADS-B data that can be used to rapidly identify spoofing. This is done by analyzing the effects of spoofing on individual aircraft and identifying common patterns across multiple flights.