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Session C1: Navigation Resilience to Interference and Cyber-Attacks 1

Single-Antenna Spatial Authentication of GNSS Signals Using Supercorrelation: Real-World Meaconing Demonstration
Laurence Bennett, Johannes Rossouw van der Merwe, Javier Gonzalo Garcia, Mark Crockett, Jez Ellis-Gray, Hery Mwenegoha, Ongun Kurt, Henry Eriksson-Martin, Paulo Esteves, Steve Mole, and Manuel del Castillo, Focal Point Positioning
Location: Windsong 9-10
Date/Time: Wednesday, Sep. 16, 11:03 a.m.

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) are vulnerable to spoofing and meaconing attacks that can preserve valid signal structure while inducing misleading navigation solutions. Conventional single-antenna receivers generally lack the spatial information required to distinguish authentic satellite signals from terrestrial rebroadcast sources. This paper presents a real-world demonstration of single-antenna spatial authentication using Supercorrelation and Skyscan processing. Supercorrelation reconstructs received GNSS signals from receiver tracking outputs and applies extended coherent integration while compensating for receiver motion, satellite dynamics, and clock behaviour, thereby forming a synthetic aperture that enables spatial discrimination using a conventional single-patch antenna. Experiments are performed using dual-frequency recordings collected during an open-air meaconing scenario at Jammertest 2025 in Norway. The results show that weak authentic signal components remain recoverable in the presence of substantially stronger meaconed signals. Skyscan measurements of the authentic components remain spatially consistent with their expected satellite directions, whereas meaconed components associated with different satellites exhibit a common spatial origin consistent with the terrestrial transmitter. For the approximately linear motion typical of short automotive integration intervals, the signal direction is primarily constrained to a cone about the vehicle velocity vector, while changes in vehicle heading provide additional spatial diversity and enable more localised Direction of Arrival (DOA) estimation. A cone-angle error is used to quantify spatial consistency with the expected satellite geometry and enables direct spatial authentication of the received signals. For the analysed Galileo E1C meaconed and E5Q authentic signal populations, the resulting Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) achieves an Area Under the Curve (AUC) of 0.989. At the Equal Error Rate (EER) operating point, the probabilities of false alarm and missed detection are both approximately 3.0%, corresponding to a probability of detection of approximately 97.0%. These results demonstrate the potential of motion-enabled spatial authentication for detecting terrestrial rebroadcast signals without requiring a multi-element antenna array, providing a single-antenna complement to Navigation Message Authentication (NMA).

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