GNSS Spoofing Detection and Localization Using ADS-B Data
Zixi Liu, Sherman Lo, Juan Blanch, Todd Walter, Stanford University
Date/Time: Thursday, Sep. 19, 4:23 p.m.
GNSS spoofing poses significant threats to aviation safety by misleading aircraft about their true location, increasing the risk of collision with obstacles or entry into restricted airspaces. The growing reliance on GNSS for critical systems makes the rapid detection and localization of interference events crucial. While ground-based GNSS spoofing detection methods are available, they are limited by line-of-sight (LOS) constraints, making large-scale deployment costly in both time and resources. In contrast, airborne GNSS receivers, such as those on aircraft using the ADS-B system, offer a broader LOS due to their altitude. By leveraging the widespread availability of open ADS-B data, this study introduces and validates an algorithm for detecting and localizing GNSS spoofing events using ADS-B.
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