Ensuring PNT Resilience: A Global Review of Navigation Policies and Roadmaps
Joshua Critchley-Marrows, The University of Sydney; Quentin Verspieren, The University of Tokyo
Date/Time: Thursday, Sep. 14, 4:00 p.m.
Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) services have become the backbone of numerous vital infrastructures: banking and financial networks rely on space-based timing, various transportation services are fully dependent on satellite positioning, and so on. Any disruption of space-based PNT services, whether intentional or accidental, could have dramatic consequences for national security, public safety and economic security. In consequence, states owning and operating Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) – or Regional NSS (RNSS) – have grown extremely concerned by the reliance of their infrastructure and its ability to provide stable and trustworthy PNT signals.
Considering the crucial importance of PNT services for national safety and security, most major space powers have issued strategy documents for the development, sustainment, or improvement of resilient national PNT capabilities. These documents can take various forms based on the usual practices of each government, namely policies, plans, roadmaps, etc. In addition, while some are focussing specifically on improving PNT resilience, others have a more general scope.
Emerging space nations have also assessed current PNT capabilities, highlighting concerns over sovereignty as well as improving performance, availability and robustness. These statements have either formed part of a greater roadmap towards developing or improving a nation's space capabilities, or are a direct policy statement to PNT development. Different political forces are often at play, being shaped either together or in parallel with defence perspectives.
How did these concerns manifest themselves? What are the resilience considerations included in the PNT policies and roadmaps that have been adopted by major operators of GNSS/RNSS and other spacefaring countries in recent years? This presentation will provide a review and comparative analysis of the main navigation policies and strategy documents in the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Tukey and others, to ensure the resilience of PNT services.
It should be noted that while this presentation emphasises the dangerous reliance of numerous critical infrastructures on GNSS/RNSS, this presentation does not only focus on the resilience of the said GNSS/RNSS but more generally on PNT resilience, which can be realised through alternative infrastructures, such as terrestrial communication networks (e.g. VDES, eLORAN, 5G). Accordingly, some of the countries analysed in the article do not – yet – operate their own space-based PNT infrastructure, such as Turkey and South Korea.
Throughout the work, critical themes are exposed to the concern of governments. These may include the definition of resilience, which is often misinterpreted, misunderstood or unclear by agencies, the ownership of PNT and if more private approaches are necessary for the development of future PNT, government coordination and agency responsibility, to what boundaries should alternative PNT services stretch to, and the critical issue of national sovereignty.
The presentation attempts to address each of these themes, based on the input from various experts by interview and extensive review of policy and technical documents concerning PNT, resilience and space programmes. Results are consolidated and recommendations made towards achieving resilient PNT. Given that this is a global problem with common themes, a global perspective and solution is offered.
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